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Two recent cases warrant the hope that courts are becoming
less disposed to encourge corporate financing schemes which per-
mit investors to be treated as creditors for purposes of security,
and as stockholders for purposes of profit.' These cases deal with
instruments entitled "Participating Operation Certificates", which
have become popular in the promotion and financing of chain
gasoline and accessory stations. The language of the certificate
is the same (mutatis mutandis) in both cases and reads as follows:
"Consumers Service Stations, Inc., . . . for and in
consideration of the receipt of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars,
and other good and valuable consideration, agrees to create
a fund from the operation of a so-called service station in
the place designated on the reverse side hereof (Oskaloosa,
Iowa) and to distribute said fund in the manner hereinafter
set forth to the registered owner of this certificate and all
other registered owners of such certificates in said station,
and such distribution shall continue until there shall have
been paid on this certificate the sum of Five Hundred Dol-
lars, whereupon it shall become null and void.
"To provide the fund hereinbefore mentioned from the
daily receipts of said station, there shall be set aside in a
bank one cent (io) on each gallon of gasoline and five per
cent (5%) on all other merchandise sold by said station, and
the fund thus created shall be distributed every month among
the registered holders of these certificates in said station, as
their interests may appear."
There is no necessity for discussing the claims of the certifi-
cate holders in the cases referred to, to be equitable lien holders,
for the interesting point is that in each case the certificate holders
were held to be not even general creditors of the issuing cor-
poration. The grounds upon which the courts appear to have
'In re Hawkeye Oil Co., 19 F. (2d) 15, (D. C. Del. 1927). United States
& Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Co., ig F. (2d) 624 (W. D.
Pa. 1924). See Note, (1927) 76 U. oF PA. L. Rlv. 80.
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based their judgments .may not be wholly satisfactory, but it is
submitted that the result reached is highly desirable and indicates
a judicial tendency to consider stockholders as stockholders and
creditors as creditors, and refuse to permit the two to change
places as special considerations may suggest the advantage of
such change.
Probably the most important factor in the development of
industry and commerce within the last one hundred and fifty
years was the recognition by the courts of the principle of the
limited liability of shareholders. With the general acceptance of
the doctrine that one could risk a specific amount of capital in a
commercial venture without thereby engaging his private fortune
as security for the success of the enterprise, great sums became
available for commercial development.
The recognition of limited liability is, comparatively speak-
ing, a recent thing. As late as Lord Nottingham's time, in a case
where certain of the shareholders of a corporation were also
creditors, it was said that "if loss must fall upon the creditors,
such losses should be lforne by those who were members of the
company, who best knew their estates and credit, and. not by
strangers who were drawn in to trust the company upon the credit
and countenance it had from such particular members."' 2 And
well into the nineteenth century we find an occasional case in
which the limited liability of stockholders is not yet accepted.3 In
the main, however, a stockholders's limited liability had been
fully recognized before the beginning of the nineteenth century,
and with this general recognition, an investor for the first time
found himself free to engage his capital in the development of new
fields, knowing that his risk of loss was limited to the amount of
capital to which he subscribed. But when he invested in shares,
his postion was unequivocal. He was an adventurer; the risk
of failure was his; the fruits of success were his; he was in no
sense a creditor. In the event of failure of the enterprise he had
no rights against the corporation assets, except in the rare cases
Naylor v. Brown, Temp. Finch 83 (1673), 23 Eng. Reprints 44.
' See Samuel Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Be-
fore xRoo, (1888) 2 HAv. L. Rzv. at 162.
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in which creditors were paid in full and a balance remained. The
creditor advanced his money upon the security of the corporate
assets. The stockholder advanced his upon the hope of a profit-
able utilization of the corporate assets. His status was fixed;
there was no possibility of confusion regarding his position. He
did not blow hot and cold. He was an owner of the enterprise;
he was not a creditor. With his status thus defined, commercial
development was carried in the nineteenth century to lengths
theretofore unknown and unimagined.
But toward the end of the nineteenth century there developed
a tendency to tempt creditors with the promise or hope of a share
of the corporation's profits, and a corresponding tendency to
encourge investment by stockholders with the promise of a security
akin to a creditor's. An example of a case of this kind is found
in an insurance policy which was popular a quarter of a century
or more ago and which was known as Tontine Insurance. The
insured was the holder of an endowment policy which ran for a
period of years at a stated premium. If the insured died during
the endowment period, his beneficiary or his estate was entitled
to collect the face amount of the policy. If the insured survived
the endowment period, he was entitled to receive from the insur-
ance company not only the face amount of the policy but whatever
profits had accrued to his policy by reason of the longevity of
other policy holders in the same group, or by economy in admin-
istration, or wise investment of the premiums of that group. While
the insured was always considered a creditor of the insurance
company,4 he none the less received some of the profits of the
company which could ordinarily only have been distributed to
stockholders, so that a dual relationship came into being, or at
least a rapproachment of stockholder and creditor.
Another example is the case of income bonds. The holder
of income bonds is undoubtedly a corporate creditor,5 and it not
infrequently happens that his debt is secured by the mortgage
' Peters v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, i96 Mass. 43, 81i N. E. 965
(1907) ; Pierce v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 145 Mass. 56, 12 N. E.
863 (i887) ; Ulham v. New York Life Assurance Co., iog N. Y. 421, 17 N. E.
365 (1888).
' Edwards v. Bay State Gas Co., 91 Fed. 946 (D. C. Del. 1898).
CREDITORS AND STOCKHOLDERS
of the corporation, with a definite date named upon which he is
entitled to demand the face amount of his bond. Nearly every-
thing else points to his being a stockholder rather than a creditor.
There is no obligation on the part of the company to pay the in-
terest named in the bond, unless, during the period covered by the
particular coupon, the company has earned the interest due. Even
where the interest has been earned, the question is still to an
extent one of discretion with the directors as to whether such
earnings should be applied to additions and betterments, or to
reserves for depreciation, or to other corporate purposes, to the
partial or total exclusion of the bondholder's right to collect in-
terest for the period in question.6 Income bonds are often issued
in lieu of preferred stock in cases in which the corporation credit
is not sufficiently strong to allow of the sale of preferred stock,
so that a bond is offered to the investor with a high return upon
his investment and an ultimate security for the corpus of the
investment by the obligation, or mortgage obligation, of the
corporation. In some cases even the voting rights of stockholders
have been conferred upon income bondholders, and in at least
two important issues the bondholders were entitled to elect one
less than the majority of the directors of the corporation in
periods during which the interest remained unpaid. In fact, the
stockholder character of the income bond holder seems to have
been so well recognized that one author says that "the temptation
to placate impatient security holders by what is a bond in name
but not in substance seems to have been too great to.resist." 7
One of the best illustrations of cases in which the investor
becomes a creditor, for purposes of security of investment, but a
stockholder, for possibilities of speculative gains, is the con-
vertible bond. -A convertible bondholder may be indifferently
either a creditor or a stockholder, as the advantage of the one
position over the other may be, at a particular time, made to ap-
pear. If the corporation is prosperous and its stock increases in
value, he becomes a stockholder and shares in dividends, and extra
dividends, and the rise in value of his stock. If the success of
6 i D WING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (920) 84.
7 I DmVING, FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1920) 86-87.
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the company is uncertain, he remains a creditor, and in all likeli-
hood a mortgage creditor. He is in effect at once a stock-
-holder and a creditor. To such an extent is he recognized
as a stockholder that the courts hold that where stock may not be
issued below par, they will enjoin the issuance of bonds con-
vertible into stock at prices which would, if the conversion priv-
ilege should later be exercised, amount to an issuance of the
stock under par.8 Of late years there has grown up a custom.
which cuts off to an extent the absolute right which the bond-
holder has to be either a creditor or a stockholder, as the advant-
age of the one or the other position may be shown. Under the
new plan, the corporation offers the right of conversion into its
stock at a low price in the case of the first designated percentage
of the bondholders who wish to convert, and a higher price for the
next designated precentage, and so on. This results in some cases
in a stampede to convert, and in such cases soon after issuance, a
considerable number of bondholders, by their precipitation to con-
vert, have definitely lost their rights as creditors and have be-
come stockholders. Such a system, while permitting of the pos-
sibility of the dual relationship, at least tends toward an earlier
definition of the status of the investor.
Another instance of the combination creditor-stockholder
status is a hardly believable one. This is the case of the partici-
pating bond. While the existence of this anomaly is rare, there are
a few examples of it in railroad and public utility finance. One
such example is the Union Pacific Railroad's Oregon Short Line
Participating 4's, which were issued in 1903 in the very consider-
able amount of $36,500,000. These bonds were entitled to partic-
ipate with the stockholders in any dividends in excess of four
percent upon certain stock which had been deposited as collateral
to secure the Participating 4's.9 This represents the most extreme
case. The bondholder is a stockholder without having to incur
the trouble or risk of converting. He receives his dividend while
still a bondholder. A convertible bondholder does, at least, lose his
8 Carver v. Southern Iron & Steel Company, 78 N. J. Eq. 81, 78 Atl.
240 (910).
'RiIPLEY, RAILROADS, FINANCE & ORGANIZATION (I915) 164, 205.
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status as a creditor when he converts. A participating bondholder
does not convert and gets his stockholder's dividend without
ever ceasing to be a creditor. An attempt to issue an obligation
of this sort was made upon the reorganization of the Phila-
delphia and Reading Railway in 1881. There the proposed obli-
gation was to be in the nominal value of $50 and to be issued for
$15. No provision was made for any maturity or payment of the
obligation, which entitled the holder to receive six percent after
the payment of six percent upon the common stock, and there-
after to participate equally with the common stock. Under the
charter provisions of the company, it had the right to borrow
money and the question before the court was whether such an ob-
ligation was a loan. The court held, however, that in the absence
of any obligation of the company ever to repay, the transaction
was essentially an attempt to issue stock in violation of the pro-
visions of the charter, and the issue was enjoined. 10
Occasional isolated instances of the" dual relationship which
do not admit of generic classification are found in the reports.
One such is In re Spot Cash Hooper Company.11 There an in-
strument called a "Trade Certificate" was before the court. The
language of the certificate was as follows:
"Trade Certificate.
Incorporated under the Laws of the State of Texas.
No. 2 $Ioo.oo
Spot Cash Hooper Company, Incorporated,
of Hillsboro, Texas.
Capital Stock, $IO,OOO.
Trade Certificates Issued, $Io,ooo.
This certifies that J. J. Mitchell has deposited with Spot
Cash Hooper Company $IOO.OO, which entitles him or the
holder thereof to purchase goods from said corporation at
a profit not to exceed IO percent. This certificate shall be
taken into account in declaring dividends, and the holder
shall receive for the use of said sum of $ioo.oo an amount
annually equal to the dividend declared, based on $20,000
"Taylor v. Philadelphia & Reading Ry., 7 Fed. 386 (E. D. Pa. I881).
ni88 Fed. 861 (W. D. Tex. 19i1).
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and paid on account of stock certificates; the holder being
guaranteed to receive at least 8 percent per annum of said
sum of $ioo.oo. After the end of two years this certificate
is payable in merchandise on demand of holder after 3o days
notice."
Upon the bankruptcy of the Spot Cash Company, objection
was urged to the creditor status of the certificate holders, but the
court held that the certificate evidenced an indebtedness provable
in bankruptcy. The language of the "Trade Certificate" in this
case savors of a participating bond, so that the disposition of the
case at least suggests that courts would hold participating bond-
holders to be creditors, should their status as such be challenged.
The Participating Operation Certificate is an attempt to pro-
vide another opportunity for persons to be at once creditors and
stockholders. Logically there would seem to be no good reason
why such a certificate holder is not as much entitled to be con-
sidered a creditor as the income bondholder, the convertible bond-
holder, the participating bondholder, or the trade certificate holder
of the Spot Cash case. Indeed, the participating certificate hold-
er's position as a creditor should be stronger than that of the
others. Ie is not actually promised a one hundred percent profit
on his investment. No time is mentioned in the certificate within
which the $500 promised in return for the $250 investment must
be paid, and it could well be that such a long repayment time was
contemplated that the transaction amounted to no more than a
loan with lawful interest.
In the Hawkeye case, sup-a, the decision of the referee in
bankruptcy, which was reviewed by the court, was to the effect
that a participating operation certificate holder was in the nature
of a dormant partner. The court upon review affirmed the ref-
eree's order but did not attempt to define the nature of the certifi-
cate holders. It contented itself with the statement that they were
co-adventurers with the stockholders and consequently not cred-
itors. In the United States Mexican Oil Company case, supra,
the court thought that the participating certificates evidenced "an
attempt on the part of the defendant to create a novel type of
stock ownership," and while admitting that the status of the cer-
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tificate holders was "rather puzzling," it concluded that the con-
tract was invalid as against the claims of creditors.
Whether the certificate holder is to be treated as a stock-
holder or as a dormant partner, it is plain that important char-
acteristics of each status are lacking. The certificate holder, ac-
cording to the terms of the instrument, is to be repaid by a charge
upon the sales of the particular station, regardless of whether
the station is being operated at a profit or at a loss, and entirely
without regard to the existence of profits or surplus applicable
to the payment of the certificates. Neither a stockholder nor a
partner, dormant or general, can be paid dividends other than
from profits or surplus,' 2 so that this important eleinent of both
the stockholder and partner relation is absent. It is also funda-
mental that in the absence of some special limitation of the right,
a partner, either dormant or general, as well as a stockholder,
is entitled to a voice in the management of the partnership enter-
prise,13 but no such right is given these certificate holders. More-
over, the participation of a dormant partner is, as a rule, a secret
one,' 4 and there is nothing in the participating operation certifi-
cate situation to indicate that all the world was not aware of
the issuance of the certificates. Thus tested by familiar prin-
ciples of the law of corporations and of partnerships, a participat-
ing certificate holder is neither a shareholder of the one nor a
member of the other. Hence, resort is had in one of the cases,
at least, (and this is doubtless the ratio decidendi of the other
case) to the great popular panacea-publi c policy. The court
concludes that "on general principles of public policy ..
this contract is void as against the claims of general creditors." 15
This simply means that in financing gasoline stations there is
no public policy which demands that in the event of insolvency,
one who wears such indicia of ownership as those suggested by
the participating operation certificate, should be treated as a
creditor. The fact that undoubtedly strikes the courts is that
22 MACHEN, CORPORATIONS, § 1313; LINDLEY, PARTNERSHIPS, Ch. 7.
"3 20 R. C. L. lO72.
1 2o R. C. L. 1072.
'United States & Mexican Oil Co. v. Keystone Auto Gas & Oil Co., supra
note i.
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this person hoped to make one hundred percent profit upon his
investment, and it would be against public policy to consider such
a person a creditor.
Since public policy, then, appears to be the moving considera-
tion in the decision that the participating operation certificate
holder is not a creditor, it is reasonable to suppose that there
was a public policy which called for the recognition by the courts
of the creditor status of the holder of the various other instru-
ments discussed. The only instance among those mentioned
which would seem to present a case involving public policy is
the income bond. Here a consideration of public policy may
properly enter in. The income bond, as a rule, is an expedient re-
sorted to in the reorganization of railroad or other public service
companies in financial difficulties. There is in this case a neces-
sity for reorganizing and re-financing, and the public by virtue
of the service for which it depends upon the company, is inter-
ested in seeing that sufficient capital for the continuation of the
business is raised. The income bond has in the past been a use-
ful device for accomplishing this result, and through its medium
junior security holders, and in some cases, even stockholders,
have been enabled to save their investments, sometimes in full,
and often in part, by a contribution of capital to the reorganized
structure in return for income bonds issued in an amount which
took into consideration the investment in the predecessor com-
pany. In such a situation there may be a public policy which
accounts for the issu.nce of a patchwork security of this type.
But while public policy is often the explanation of illogical
things, it has not as yet, so far as we are aware, demanded that
acts in the nature of legal crimes need be committed in its name.
There must be a reasonable limit, and such limit has certainly been
passed in the convertible bond, the participating bond, and the
trade certificate of the Spot Cash case. Stockholders and credit-
ors are, in the scheme of the law of corporations, two distinct
classes of people, whose interests in the corporation are of such
different natures as to be often diametrically opposed one to
the other. Should resort to devices under which rights are con-
ferred to be either the one or the other, as expediency may later
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dictate, continue to grow in popularity, the effect must be the
ultimate breaking down of the barrier between stockholders and
creditors, a result which will necessitate the re-writing of an im-
portant part of the law of corporations. No consideration of
public policy demands such violence as this to established prin-
ciples of law. On the contrary, any consideration of public policy
which exists calls for restriction and not multiplication of devices
which clothe investors with the dual rights of stockholders and
creditors. The refusal to accord to the holders of participating
operation certificates the rights of creditors upon insolvency of
the company issuing the certificates, is at least a move in the
right direction.
